The Tyranny of the Minority

Majority triumphs, they say. We must resist the tyranny of the majority, we’re told.

But what if it’s a determined minority that actually calls the shots?

Nassim Nicholas Taleb posits that an intransigent minority can almost always prevail over a flexible majority.

His reasoning, though counterintuitive, is simple: “Someone with a peanut allergy will not eat products that touch peanuts but a person without such allergy can eat items without peanut traces in them.”

Producing and distributing only non-peanut products is easier than segregating the food based on the peanut content.

English has become the de-facto lingua franca of the business world not because the majority of the people are native speakers. Rather, it boils down to the fact that those non-native in English still know English (irrespective of their fluency levels). But, native English speakers are less likely to know other languages at the most elementary level.

As Taleb grimly notes: “Formation of moral values in society doesn’t come from the evolution of the consensus. No, it is the most intolerant person who imposes virtue on others precisely because of that intolerance.”

How Public Choice Theory Further Clarifies This

As I explained in a previous newsletter, “Public Choice Theory simply asks us to make the same assumptions about human behavior in the political sphere as we make when we analyze markets”.

The public stakeholders are supposed to be motivated by common good alone. But, significantly, they are bound to approach common good in a way that aligns with their self-interest too.

This phenomenon is visibly clearer when it relates to influencing legislative bodies.

Smaller groups with shared interests (like farmers) are more likely to organize themselves effectively. Because they know their cause doesn’t enjoy popularity among the majority. They are a set of (relatively) homogenous people who have much to gain or lose due to a policy update. Their interest intensity also reduces the probability of freeloaders.

Contrast this with a larger group like customers or taxpayers. Since they are more heterogeneous in composition, they face more difficulty in organizing themselves. Their vested interest in the policy update is scattered due to the sheer numbers. Paradoxically, this means that individuals perceive their role to be less consequential in the larger game. The environment is a breeding ground for freeloaders with little skin in the game.

As a result, smaller groups with concentrated interests can readily outfox larger groups with diffused interests.

For instance, a farmer lobby to prevent foreign imports causes only a little inconvenience to customers (lesser options). But it can disproportionately improve farmer revenues. Further, such a lobby typically has the means and motivation to influence politicians in their favor with a promise to contribute to election campaign funds.

Where does this leave the majority?

I quote from Eamonn Butler’s “Public Choice – A Primer”.

“Sadly, the fact that consumers and taxpayers are rarely organized as an effective political force – together with the growth of government programmes, the proliferation of politically active pressure groups and the expansion of the lobbying industry – suggests that the answer might be that the majority’s silence could last a long time.”