On September 18, 2023, the Indian parliament passed the historic Women’s Reservation Bill. The law proposes to reserve one-third of the seats in Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies for women.

How will it work?
- First, a census needs to be conducted.
- Based on the census, delimitation will be undertaken to reserve seats for women.
- Seats reserved for women will be rotated after each delimitation exercise.
- A sunset clause of 15 years is proposed, though the Parliament can continue to push the date as it deems necessary.
So, the reservation can start only after the census and delimitation is completed.
Many sections have questioned the need to have census and delimitation as a prerequisite for the bill’s implementation. In response, the government contends that since reservations for SC/ST are already in place, there could be an overlap if the women’s bill is introduced immediately.
Since India typically holds a census after every 10 years (to be now followed by delimitation), the reserved seats are scheduled to rotate every 10 years too.
Policy problems galore
While nobly intended, the bill’s implementation on ground is fraught with challenges.
- India has already implemented one-third women reservation in local government bodies like panchayats and municipalities. But in reality, as the popular Hindi Web Series ‘Panchayat’ so hilariously depicted, it’s men who still run the show behind the doors (sometimes openly so). Since many political parties in India are dynasty-based, it’s women from these politically influential families who will be foisted on people. These women will be pushed wherever a seat becomes reserved.
- The rotational basis of seat allocation, while it could be harmless elsewhere, is uniquely disastrous to the Indian context.
If implemented, it would mean that the parliament (in every 10 years) will comprise one-third women whose seat will become unreserved the next time, and one-third men who will be disallowed from contesting the next time. As MJ Akbar noted way back in 2010, when the bill was tabled in parliament, “Two-thirds of the Lok Sabha, therefore, will have no political incentive to serve its constituents. This, given prevailing levels of public morality, is a license to satisfy personal interests for the length of the term to MP and minister. ”
The incentive to be re-elected is why most of India’s public representatives work (if at all). If they know that they cannot be re-elected no matter how well they worked, many candidates may be encouraged to indulge in corruption without reservation (pun intended). In any case, they have no incentive to invest long term in their constituencies.
- Since they were only pitted against other women (where men contestants were disallowed), the winning women legislators could face legitimacy deficit. The rotational nature of candidature can mean that they don’t have enough time to build their leadership capacity and brand. Yes, these women candidates can opt to contest in non-reserved seats too. But how likely is that?
- Further, not all women are uniformly disadvantaged against men as a class. A woman from a dominant caste and born into wealth and connections is a privileged person. A man coming from a modest background, disadvantaged caste, doesn’t become privileged merely by virtue of his human anatomy.
Instead of top-down imposition, India must find a way to encourage women’s representation at the political party level. Political parties must have the flexibility to post women candidates at constituencies that they think are winnable. If forced to comply, women candidates can be posted in constituencies the party doesn’t hope to win anyway.
Lastly, human identities are not cast in stone. They’re not a monolith. While there indeed is a need to increase women’s participation in Indian politics, this is not the only disadvantaged group. A policy primed to level the playing field across categories, though less glamorous and long-term, is the way forward.
A rising wave lifts all the boats.
As Madhu Kishwar eloquently puts it: “… people take these identity layers for granted and they find expression in their appropriate realms at different points of time. However, a group or person may begin to assert a particular identity with greater vigour if it provides greater access to power and opportunities, as happens with caste or gender-based job reservations. Alternately, a person begins to assign a high priority to a particular basic identity if she or he perceives it as threatened or suppressed, especially if that identity is essential to the person’s personal, economic or social well-being.”
I don’t agree with this argument that due to rotation every 10 years women or men will not work due to no incentive. As u mentioned next time the seat will not be reserved for men, women can still fight the election and if men won the election, he will not come to know 4-4.5 years that seat will go to woman ad hence if he wants he will keep working with same pation. That’ the whole concept of rotation in field of life.
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Hi Inderjeet – In India, the public doesn’t have a provision to recall a leader once elected. Even if the leader is brazenly corrupt, the public can only unseat them after 5 years. The only check against an elected leader is the incentive to win the next election. If this sole incentive is nullified every 10 years, 2/3rd of Indian constituencies will have leaders who are unaccountable to them.
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